The Middle East and the Balkans. What has changed since the 1990s? by Dr. Miad Nakhavali

 Dr. Miad Nakhavali

CEO of Middle East Analitika

Due to its richness of natural resources and energy supply, the Middle East has historically been a crucial strategic location for the entire world. As a result, this region has a huge influence on many parts of the world, including the Balkans. Nonetheless, this influence has a distinctive and diverse style in the Balkans. Given what happened and is currently happening in the Middle East, we may say that the Balkans are both directly and indirectly influenced by this region. The Middle East's regional power struggle, which grew more intense throughout at least three important periods—the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Arab Spring in 2011—has reinforced proxy warfare in the region and fueled sectarianism.  The outcome of these conflicts was reflected in the massive migration of people from the Middle East through the Balkans to European countries.

Hence it would appear that the Balkans were indirectly impacted by the conflict between regional powers in the Middle East. Yet, due to the fact that in the eyes of Balkan politicians, the migration crisis is not a concern for them since they think that the migrants are unwilling to remain on the Balkan territory, due to the region's poor economic status, and intend to transit through these countries to reach Europe. Though, this was undoubtedly a simplistic view of the situation because, it's clear that as the number of migrants rises, more problems are emerging now. The alarms are sounding more frequently in the Balkans as a result of certain security worries about the criminal activities of the migrants. For instance, numerous armed clashes between various migrant groups have recently taken place in the northern Serbian city of Subotica. 

Despite the fact that the migration crisis is no longer a surprise for the Balkan region, politicians still seem reluctant to find solutions to this problem, and it appears that migrants are not on any priority lists for the Balkan authorities. Arguably the most significant causes of this neglect are a lack of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the crisis, the poor economic position, and corruption. Hence, from the evidence we've presented thus far, it is clear that the Balkan equations have been impacted by Middle Eastern developments. Yet, this is not the whole story since the Middle East also directly impacted the Balkans in different periods of time. 

With the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Middle Eastern regional powers chose to help the local Muslims. During the crisis, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf countries were among the most influential players, and they provided the Muslims with financial aid, supplies, and weaponry. We know, for instance, that Iran was instrumental in bringing together various Jihadi groups in the Balkans and that it employed a variety of tactics to aid Muslims.  Using the red cross mask to deliver supplies and weaponry to the region was one of these tactics. In his interview, Former IRGC Qods member Saeed Ghasemi admits that he and his comrades were in Bosnia, under the red cross cover, to train Mujahedins. Also, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia, was the subject of numerous allegations that he was an Iranian loyalist, and evidence from the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that Iranian agents secretly sent him at least $500,000 in cash.

On the other hand, throughout the 1990s, Saudi Arabia, which was aware of Iranian influence, attempted to increase its impact on the region by giving $300 million in weaponry supplies and $500 million in humanitarian help to the Bosnian government. Unsurprisingly, a large number of Arab and Muslim fighters also showed up to fight alongside their Balkan peers. The Persian Gulf countries, in particular the UAE, have also decided to act in a manner similar to Saudi Arabia and have given aid to the local Muslims. We also know that the UAE was an important player in the KFOR peacekeeping mission in the Balkan region only a little after the conflict. Yet, following the war, each of these roles—from the Iranian IRGC personnel to Saudi Arabia's Salafi agents and the Persian Gulf's wealthy supporters took on a different form.

After the Dayton agreement was signed, the Bosnian government was under intense pressure from the United States to expel all security, military, and religious agents from this country. As a result, since the late 1990s, regional powers in the Middle East made the decision to shift their influence from hard power to soft power. Iran shifted its attention to civil society and established numerous cultural and religious institutions, including the Ibn Sina Institute. The primary activities of this institute include the publication of books and articles, some of which are written by Iranian leaders and focus on Shiism. This institution has connections to the Sarajevo University of Islamic Studies and has also made an effort to establish itself in the Sandzak region. 

Iran also operated a religious organization in Albania called the Quran Foundation at the same time as another cultural institution named Sadi Shirazi. It also sought to establish this type of organization in order to connect with opinion makers, intellectuals, and elites while also promoting its principles in the Balkan countries. Furthermore, Iran has opened a cultural center in Serbia where citizens may learn Persian for free, connect with Iranian organizations, and learn more about the Iranian-Islamic culture. Also, Iran established a religious foundation called the Kom Foundation, which is managed by its associates the Halilovic brothers in Serbia. In Albania, though, all Iranian institutions and organizations are closed as a result of the anxiety regarding the possibility that Tehran might cyber attack Albania. However, many people remain concerned that Iran might use its network of allies to maintain its influence in Albania. We should not forget that Iranian cultural and religious organizations are still active in other Balkan nations, and they will continue to endeavor to increase their impact there. 

Saudi Arabia had a significant impact on the Muslims in the Balkans even before Yugoslavia broke apart since it is the birthplace of Islam and the heartland of its history. Many thousands of Muslims, including the Balkan Muslims, go there each year for the pilgrimage due to the location of the two holiest mosques in this country. As a result, Saudi Arabia and the Muslims in the Balkans already had a lot of links and connections. On the other side, Saudi Arabia was also watching how the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution was determined to promote its ideals among Muslims in the Balkans and beyond its borders. Since they did not want to get left behind in this competition, they strove to advance their ideals immediately.

Saudi Arabia had a fantastic opportunity to increase its influence in the Balkan region with the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Although Saudi Arabia provided Muslims with millions of dollars in financial aid, supplies, and weapons during the war in the 1990s, Saudis, exactly like Iranians, had to adjust their strategies after the war. Saudi Arabians attempted to increase their influence after the year 2000 by investing and using their economic might. For instance, numerous investments were made by the Al-Shiddi Group and other Arab corporations' subsidiaries. On the other hand, as seen by the large amounts of money allocated to programs like the construction of mosques, the restoration of sacred sites, the provision of scholarships for clergy, and numerous other initiatives, religion was also a conscious component of the smart power strategy of Saudis. For instance, Al-Haramain, a Saudi organization that promotes Wahabism globally, was one of the key players in orienting the funds in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania. Many people still have their suspicions that this organization and its branches are still in operation, despite the fact that it was allegedly "closed" by joint action of the US and Saudi Arabia.  

Even though many people worry that Saudi Arabia's involvement will jeopardize the security of the Western Balkans' internal and external borders, and even though there is a strong correlation between the number of foreign militants who left the region to fight in Syria and Iraq and Saudi Arabia's supported mosques, there is little that Balkan politicians can do about it. Companies based in Saudi Arabia have been purchasing land in Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The Al-Shiddi Group is developing hotels, has invested in FlyBosnia, acquired Serbia's largest airline carrier, and is developing an entire residential complex in Belgrade. Balkan government officials and their families typically stand to gain the most from these ventures. So, it is likely that they do not want to be overly critical of the Saudis. Saudi Arabia will therefore continue to employ economic means to influence the Muslim population in the region and gain from both investment and its religious influence in the Balkans. 

From the other angle, considering how the countries of the Persian Gulf engage with the Balkans, it is undeniable that the UAE has an important sway in the region. Despite having the same stance for supporting the Muslims during the Yugoslav war in the 1990s, Persian Gulf countries have adopted a very pragmatic approach to the region following the war. For instance, The UAE has made significant investments in the Balkan region in the four key sectors of construction, aviation, agriculture, and the military industry based on its post-oil policy. Yet, based on the data provided by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the UAE appears to be investing the most in Serbia, followed by Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo.

However, despite the fact that these investments are essential for accelerating the modernization of the region’s cities and economies, a lack of transparency and accountability, an increase in local prices, and a potential shift in cultural norms are the main concerns for policymakers. Additionally, according to research done by LSE European Institute, the warning signs point to a top-down, largely secret manner of commercial operations that can reinforce the current political and economic elites through clientelist tactics. Hence, non-transparent investments ought to be a high concern for EU policymakers due to the likelihood that they could undermine the conditionality of the rule-based approach made explicit in the EU accession process.

In conclusion, we may expect that the Middle East regional powers would continue to compete for influence in that region and in the Balkans while also engaging in a rivalry with one another. As a result, on the one hand, we can anticipate a larger wave of migration moving through the Balkans in the coming years, while on the other, we can expect that the Middle Eastern regional powers will fill the gap left by the absence of the EU.