Masoud Pezeshkian's victory by Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh



Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh

Convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum


The voters favoured Pezeshkian because the alternative was so much worse. Jalili promised more of the same. That meant confrontation with the US and Israel, greater sanctions, and high inflation. Faced with 4 more years of internal and external crisis, voters have favoured Pezeshkian who promises to de-escalate tensions and run the government more professionally, not along ideological lines.


Prospects of Change:

There are some red lines that Pezeshkian will not cross: Iran’s support for Hezbullah and Hamas will continue because that is engrained in the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Iran claims to represent and lead the global Muslim community against American imperialism and its local agent: Israel. As a result Pezeshkian will not challenge these red-lines but will avoid overtly antagonistic statements. He is likely to avoid megaphone diplomacy that was the style of the conservatives. They took every chance to declare publicly their antagonism towards the United States. We can expect more statesmen-like behaviour from Pezeshkian and his administration. He would hope that toning down the rhetoric would help improve Iran’s relations with the West and remove some of the sanctions on Iran. But this hope maybe misplaces as the US goes to presidential election with Trump as the likely winner in Washington. 

Pezeshkian is constrained by the political structure and system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is not the head of state and does not have ultimate control over Iran’s strategic direction. The Supreme leader enjoys that power.  Pezeshkian will certainly change the tone of Iranian foreign policy, but it is difficult to see how any of the key priorities might change.

Participation rate: 

More than half of the electorate have lost hope that change is possible from within. They have seen the record of past presidents Khatami and Rouhani, who promised change and failed to deliver. The voters are alienated from the regime; and the leadership is very much aware of this. The Supreme Leader invited mass participation in elections as a show of force against the ‘enemy’[the United States]. The low turn out is a clear indication of widespread disillusionment with the system as a whole. 

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