Will superpowers play a role in escalating tensions in the Middle East? By Lorenzo Trombetta

 Source: Elcano Royal Institute

Lorenzo Trombetta

Senior Middle Eastern Correspondent

Senior MidSenior Middle Eastern Correspondentdle Eastern Correspondent

Nowadays, especially after October 7, the entire Middle Eastern region is almost unanimously depicted as a battlefield marked by various trenches of attrition wars, poised to trigger a final and devastating sequence toward a total and large-scale conflict. Behind this image, often evoked in both Middle Eastern and Western public debates by local political elites and diplomatic circles, lies a more nuanced and complex reality. This reality consists of a series of tacit and unwritten agreements between rival actors, based on a convergence of strategic and long-lasting interests: the maintenance of power within a political status quo.

This status quo, which appears to have been challenged by the unprecedented Hamas operation on October 7, 2023, won’t be easily or radically altered because none of the local, regional, or international actors have a genuine interest in changing the equation, which underpins the dominance of most political, military, institutional, and financial elites in the Middle East. For instance, it is highly likely that Hamas will remain dominant in the Gaza Strip and may seek to compete with the moribund Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. However, the latter will not be entirely swept away. Even in the eventual post-Mahmoud Abbas context, it is very likely that the gerontocracy at the helm of Fatah will remain the primary structure of reference in the Palestinian territories west of the Jordan River.

Similarly, it is highly likely that Israeli leadership—with or without Netanyahu—will continue to garner support primarily through the fear of external enemies, basing its main political choices on this fear, waging so-called pre-emptive attacks, and responding to threats with lethal rounds of massive aerial and ground military offensives. Looking beyond Palestine and Israel, there are no signs on the horizon that the power structure in Iran will change or shift its political direction. Likewise, it is improbable that the consociational power equation in Lebanon will transform to such an extent that it weakens Hezbollah's political, military, and cultural influence. Although the media periodically claim that the Lebanese armed movement is losing support in the country following October 7, Hezbollah remains, and will remain, the primary political force in Lebanon, capable of shaping Beirut's policy on both pressing internal issues and regional matters.

In this context, international powers have long been actively involved in defining this tacit status quo. The United States maintains a military presence within Iraq and Syria and around the Middle East (Hormuz, Eastern Mediterranean). Russia, although militarily focused on the Eastern European front, remains entrenched in the region with its navy, troops, and military administrators well-established in Syria. Moscow, which tactically coordinates with Israel, has also strengthened and expanded energy, political, and diplomatic ties with the Gulf Arab countries in recent years.

Moreover, the effects of this status quo have become evident in the case of the conflict in Yemen. China played a decisive role in facilitating the thaw in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, helping to freeze the war in Yemen between forces aligned with Iran and those backed by Riyadh. The presence of the Houthis on the Red Sea had been tolerated for almost a decade until, in the post-October 7 context, Iranian-backed Yemeni forces began to stress Israeli and Western commercial interests. 

The subsequent Western military intervention in the Red Sea was not aimed at profoundly altering the balance but rather at negotiating with the Houthis and their Iranian ally for a less hostile stance around Bab al-Mandab. This overall and shared approach aligns with the dominant actors' need to maintain their positions within the Middle Eastern status quo, at the expense of the rights and development prospects of about 300 million inhabitants of the region.