What are the implications of Trump's victory for the ongoing tensions in the Middle East? By Dr. Eric Lob

 



Source:hespress.com


Professor Dr. Eric Lob

Associate Professor at Florida International University


President Donald Trump will confront heightened regional escalation when taking office if tensions in the Middle East continue along the same trajectory between November and January. Currently, the conflict continues between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite Tel Aviv having decapitated and degraded both adversaries. Concurrently, Iran is purportedly planning to launch another attack against Israel, with greater American assets deployed around the region, including on Israeli soil. So far, US diplomacy has failed to deliver a ceasefire in Gaza or Lebanon, secure the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, or dial down tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran. 

During the US presidential election on November 5th, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who favored a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza. Netanyahu’s government also repressed Israeli citizens who protested his dismissal of Gallant and de-prioritization of the hostages. Gallant was one of the last constraints on Netanyahu and his rightwing coalition as they pursued their declared goal of total victory – which Gallant and others have called a pipedream. Even when Gallant was in the government, Israel conducted operations in Gaza and Lebanon that inflicted colossal carnage and collateral damage and created a humanitarian catastrophe. Since September, if not before, the unstated Israeli policy in northern Gaza has been to shoot, starve, and displace the population so that a buffer zone can be created that presumably contains Jewish settlements. 

Assuming the status quo remains or worsens, the question is whether Trump will repeat his policies of the past by giving Netanyahu and his coalition carte blanche support to continue waging war in Gaza and Lebanon and against Iran. Trump’s propensity to do so would be influenced by his close personal relationship with Netanyahu, even if it became strained after he had recognized the results of the US presidential election in 2020. This propensity would be reinforced by donors, supporters, and appointees of Trump who are pro-Israel and anti-Iran, along with reports that he had been the target of an Iranian assassination attempt during his campaign. As president, Trump could continue his maximum pressure campaign by maintaining and increasing sanctions against Iran. This campaign continued under the Biden administration, even while it indirectly negotiated with Tehran, exchanged prisoners with it, and unfroze some of its assets. 

At the same time, Trump’s dealmaking tendencies and isolationist instincts could be ignited if he were to conclude that continued conflict and intensified instability in the region, alongside an expanded US military presence there to the benefit of Russia and China, run counter to America’s long-term interests or those of his presidency and legacy. In the process, Trump could pressure and incentivize Netanyahu to wrap up the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. Trump could condition a ceasefire and hostage-prisoner deal on more US military aid to Israel and on prospective Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia within the framework of the Abraham Accords. 

The Accords have comprised another point of continuity with the Biden administration. Before Hamas’s brutal attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, the administration had aspired to normalize relations between Tel Aviv and Riyadh. Recently, it has attempted to decouple an American-Saudi security agreement from Israeli normalization given Riyadh’s reluctance to pursue it without Palestinian statehood. While Saudi Arabia may welcome a Trump presidency for relational reasons and personalistic purposes, it may also be reticent to align too closely with the United States against Iran. During Trump’s first presidency, the Iranian(-backed) drone and missile strike on Saudi oil processing facilities prompted Riyadh to pursue diplomacy with Tehran to reduce regional tensions, culminating in the Chinese-brokered agreement that both sides subsequently signed in 2023. 

As farfetched as it may seem, the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that Trump may try to negotiate with Iran and its reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian. The latter has expressed an openness to constructively engage with the United States to alleviate Iran’s international isolation and economic adversity. During his first presidency, Trump was reportedly rebuffed by Iranian president Hassan Rouhani while seeking to speak with him on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. Although domestic and regional interests may inhibit or impede Trump from doing the same with Pezeshkian, one can never fully predict the policy whims of the US president.

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