What's behind the mass protests across Turkey? - by Barın Kayaoğlu

 

Source: cfr.org

What's behind the mass protests across Turkey? 

Barın Kayaoğlu 

Independent Analyst & Consultant

One could read current events in Türkiye from several angles:

(1) Trying to fix long-term judicial independence and rule of law issues, but breaking them further and further like in a “Mr. Bean” movie. You know the scene—Mr. Bean accidentally touches something, then breaks or messes it up, and his every attempt to fix the problem worsens it. Back in 2010, to lessen the staunchly secularist influence over the judiciary (that had almost closed down the ruling AK Party in 2008), the AK Party expanded the number of judges in the upper courts and packed them with judges and prosecutors it thought were loyal to it. However, those cadres turned out to be more loyal to the network of Fethullah Gulen. 

It was those Gulenist judges and prosecutors and their fellow Gulenists in the national police force who released wiretaps involving (then Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2013-14, hoping to make him more pliable to their demands for influence—if not oust him outright. The AK Party government then increased its control over the judiciary and the bureaucracy to purge the Gulenists. In turn, Gulenists staged the coup attempt against Mr. Erdoğan in July 2016. This back and forth has considerably weakened public trust in state institutions, especially the judiciary. Added to that is how violent criminals get relatively light sentences but people who are accused of “terror” charges on flimsy grounds are locked up for extended durations. In that respect, the youth-led protests are a reaction to that and not so much about the person of Mr. Ekrem İmamoğlu, the recently jailed mayor of İstanbul.

While people do not want the rights of the mayor of Türkiye’s largest city to be respect, Mr. İmamoğlu is not as popular as he used to be. There is considerable distrust toward him even among pro-opposition citizens for the perception that he’s been more interested in running for president in 2028 than running Istanbul now.  It also didn’t help that Mr. İmamoğlu did not put his name forward in the 2023 presidential elections and deferred to the then-chairman of his CHP, Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who lost to President Erdoğan. The other opposition candidate, Mr. Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of the capital Ankara, is stronger in the polls against President Erdoğan, although he too suffers from the belief that he should not have deferred to Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu in 2023.

(2) Presidential politics

According to the opposition, President Erdoğan is considering a run for office in 2028. A loophole in the Turkish constitution might allow him to do that, even though the term limits are for two, and he is in his third. (The debate on whether the 2017 referendum gave Mr. Erdoğan a fresh mandate so his election victory 2018 ought to count as his “first” term was never settled.) Thus, claims pro-opposition figures, Mr. Erdoğan’s followers and allies are basically trying to sideline one of his likely opponents, Mr. İmamoğlu. 

The AK Party government is rebutting that claim and arguing that the courts are independent, and the evidence against the mayor is strong. I haven’t seen any solid opinion polls on this yet, so I will hold off on commenting whether the public accepts the CHP or AK Party narrative, or if its split in the middle.

(3) Regional geopolitics / Kurdish issue

The above two angles relate to broader regional issues and one of Türkiye’s long-standing problems, the Kurdish question. Following the recent ouster of the Assad regime in Syria, Türkiye found itself in an advantageous position. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which is the Syrian branch of the militant group Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that has been fighting the Turkish government for autonomy and independence since the 1980s, has signed an agreement that would allow it to integrate into the central government in Damascus. While Türkiye, as well as the United States and most EU, recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, only Türkiye sees the SDF as such.

In this context, the AK Party government is seeking a way to disarm the PKK through working with its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and Türkiye’s Kurdish DEM Party. What sorts of concessions that might involve is not clear, but it will probably look like this: The Kurdish side will ask for an amnesty for Öcalan and others convicted of being a PKK member and/or being involved in terrorism. In turn for DEM is likely going to support the AK Party and Mr. Erdoğan for a constitutional amendment that would place his fourth-term aspirations on firmer legal footing.

Especially among secular Turkish nationalist circles, which do not like the CHP, the AK Party, or the Kurdish DEM Party, there is a perception that the case against Mr. İmamoğlu and even the protests are a distraction from this agenda.  I’m not sure if even within the AK Party or CHP there is full support to the talks with DEM and PKK when the latter has been wholly defeated by the Turkish military and police, and SDF is only being propped up because of U.S. support.

(4) Specific to the protests, a few more things

The protests are more limited in scope and measured than the Gezi Park protests of 2013. This is not an Orange Revolution like in Ukraine 2004 (or Euromaidan in 2014) or the Tamarod movement in Egypt that led to the July 2013 coup against President Mohammed Morsi.  (NB: The coup in Egypt had provided “post facto” evidence to the President. Erdoğan claimed that the Gezi protests were a “stalking horse” for a similar coup against him, even though Gezi protestors vehemently deny that.) But if an election were held tomorrow, Mr. Erdoğan still has a good chance to win, and I think his more measured reaction to the ongoing protests reflects that. He has engaged in any blanket name-calling toward today’s protestors the way he did back in 2013.

That being said, national and international markets have not taken Mr. İmamoğlu’s legal woes positively. The U.S. dollar gained considerably against the Turkish lira last week—going from about TL36.50 to the dollar up to TL41 and then going down to TL38 to the dollar. Only releasing several billion dollars from the Turkish Central Bank reserves stabilized the national currency. Foreign investors might have second thoughts about staying in Türkiye (or returning, for those who haven’t yet done so) if events continue on their current course. 

So, unlike 2013, when the Turkish economy was doing well and was the darling of global investors, the high inflation, unemployment, and currency fluctuations will ensure that neither the AK Party nor the opposition will overplay their hands so as not to get blamed for a potential weakening of the economy.