The strike in Doha was a game-changer - by Dr. Ariel Admoni
The strike in Doha was a game-changer
Short-Term Change versus Long-Term Change
Dr. Ariel Admoni.
Qatar's expert at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
For many years, there was a prevailing assumption that Doha was off-limits. Attacks within its territory in the early 2000s were the acts of isolated individuals, one of them driven by personal instability. States did not strike there. This was due to the reliance of Islamist organizations and regimes on Doha—and the financial backing they received from it—as well as the West’s need for Doha, first and foremost the United States, with its CENTCOM base funded by Qatar at $300 million per year (according to the outgoing CENTCOM commander in June 2025).
The first crack came during the Iran–Israel War, with Iran’s strike on the US base in Qatar. However, it was evident that this did not pose a serious threat to Doha. The Iranians emphasized that Qatar was not the target, and both before and after the strike, it was clear that there was ongoing coordination behind the scenes among Doha, Tehran, and Washington. Speculation even arose that Doha had deliberately taken the hit in order to grant Iran an honorable exit and to help Trump secure the ceasefire he sought.
Because of this Qatari conduct, some assumed that the recent Israeli strike in Doha was also coordinated among Washington, Jerusalem, and Doha. This time, however, that does not appear to be the case. One indication is the location of the strike: in the midst of several foreign embassies and international companies, and institutions. That location inherently exposed Doha to being perceived as vulnerable.
The international reverberations of this strike—which Israeli decision-makers surely took into account—have resulted in harsh international condemnation of Israel, including at the UN Security Council, in a special session postponed specifically so that Qatar’s prime minister could attend. On the surface, it appears that Qatar emerged strengthened in terms of international standing, with support from the Gulf, the Arab world, Europe, and even a measure of American backing (reflected in Washington’s approval of the condemnation resolution on the condition that Israel’s name not be mentioned).
Yet it must be remembered that Doha’s problematic conduct over the past three decades has generated many adversaries—above all within the Gulf itself. This was expressed in 1996, in 2014, and in the severing of relations from 2017 to 2020. That tension did not vanish even after the Al Ula Summit in Saudi Arabia. It still manifests in the media, in soft-power struggles, and in behind-the-scenes actions. Consequently, some Arab researchers concluded that Doha fears Saudi Arabia or the UAE may even have covertly assisted the Israeli strike.
Thus, the condemnations—particularly from the Arab world—must be understood as a Qatari maneuver: persuading states that failing to issue a strong denunciation of Israel could destabilize the Gulf, a matter of paramount importance to all regional leaders. In this context, MbZ’s visit to Doha and the summoning of the Israeli ambassador can be read as an Emirati attempt to maximize gains from the situation, perhaps by signing agreements with Qatar at a moment when it was weakened.
The strike damaged Doha’s core source of power. Qatar had distinguished itself as the state that could play both sides: offering protection and diplomatic assistance to the Taliban while simultaneously communicating on its behalf with Germany and the U.S.; mediating between Russia and Ukraine, Rwanda and Congo; always positioning itself as the indispensable negotiator able to tighten economic and strategic ties with both parties or with the superpowers. And it did all this without itself suffering consequences—even when angering both sides, often directly through Al Jazeera. From now on, this balancing act will be more difficult.
This biased mediation was particularly evident in the case of Israel and Hamas. During the war, Qatari spokespeople publicly expressed support for Hamas even as Doha advanced diplomatic and legal measures against Israel. The strike served as a reminder to Qatar that playing a double game with Israel carries risks to its very survival.
In the immediate term, Doha emerged as the apparent winner with diplomatic backing. But in the long term, the Israeli strike has fractured a fundamental pillar of Qatari conduct. This problematic Qatari approach has prevented genuine peace in the Middle East: its mediation has typically produced only short-term solutions serving Doha’s own interests, while exacerbating the underlying problems in the long run.
Undermining this Qatari posture may ultimately help pave the way for a more responsible regional order—one in which the Middle East no longer normalizes terrorism under humanitarian cover, but instead recognizes terrorism as an existential threat to the entire region and pursues genuine peace.
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