Middle East Analitika

  Source: Chatham house George Meneshian George Meneshian Middle East & Caucasus Analyst On 19 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a two-day visit to Azerbaijan. This was his first trip to the hydrocarbon-rich Caucasian country since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, two and a half years ago. During his stay in Baku, Putin met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev. The two leaders discussed the flourishing bilateral relations and signed several agreements on cooperation in the fields of trade, investments, connectivity, and energy. The most significant was a deal on an extensive strategic partnership between the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). Russia is highly interested in its relations with Azerbaijan. Ten days before Putin’s visit, the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, Sergei Shoigu, visited Baku on his way back from Iran. Other Russian officials have also visited Azerb

 Source: Elcano Royal Institute Lorenzo Trombetta Senior Middle Eastern Correspondent Senior MidSenior Middle Eastern Correspondentdle Eastern Correspondent Nowadays, especially after October 7, the entire Middle Eastern region is almost unanimously depicted as a battlefield marked by various trenches of attrition wars, poised to trigger a final and devastating sequence toward a total and large-scale conflict. Behind this image, often evoked in both Middle Eastern and Western public debates by local political elites and diplomatic circles, lies a more nuanced and complex reality. This reality consists of a series of tacit and unwritten agreements between rival actors, based on a convergence of strategic and long-lasting interests: the maintenance of power within a political status quo. This status quo, which appears to have been challenged by the unprecedented Hamas operation on October 7, 2023, won’t be easily or radically altered because none of the local, regional, or international

  Source: The Jerusalem Post Dr. Miad Nakhavali Founder of Middle East Analitika As Tehran remains in shock from Haniyeh's assassination, the countdown to Iran's retaliation has begun. Several scenarios are being considered for Iran's response. The first scenario involves targeting Israeli embassies, organizations, and institutions in neighboring countries, such as Azerbaijan or Iraqi Kurdistan. Another possibility is that Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy group, might launch attacks on Israeli territory. The third scenario is a direct attack from Iran on Israel. It now seems that Tehran is contemplating a fourth scenario: not retaliating at all if a peace agreement can be reached between Hamas and Israel.  From my perspective, whether Tehran chooses one of these scenarios or a combination of them, each option will carry a cost for the regime. However, It appears that Tehran may opt for a response similar to its previous actions—targeted attacks with minimal casualties, aimed spe

  Source: The New Arab Atilla Yesilada Istanbul-based senior partner of independent think tank Global Source Partners Ankara is collateral damage if the war in Middle East spills over to Lebanon, Iran, as well USA. Turkish economy is woefully dependent on imported energy, the price of which is very likely to soar, if all-out war were to break out in the region. Additionally, Turkey could lose valuable exports to Iran, Middle East and North Africa if war spending were to curtail disposable income. Already, the cessation of Israeli trade has cost $7 bn in exports, and a net $2 bn, which sounds like a small sum given $265 bn in annual exports, but in industries like construction materials, the suffering is real.   If war were to spread, Erdogan will be forced by his Islamist constituency and AKP’s new rival New Welfare Party to take even more severe measures. Erdogan may be forced to ban Azerbaijan oil exports to Israel through Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey could also lose the annual flow

Richa Bhattarai  Expert in International Conflict Management In the media today, the dominant narrative revolves around the hostile and contentious relationships of Iran with both Israel and the United States, while the United States and Israel maintain strategic alliances. However, what often goes unnoticed is the shared interests between Iran and both the United States and Israel not only during the Shah's regime but also under the post-revolutionary Islamic regime. The complexities of this trio can be simplified if we focus on mutual interests rather than conflicting attitudes. Setting aside the contentious issue of Israel's existence, especially in light of events post-October 7, 2024, it becomes crucial to examine whether the Iran-Israel relationship is inherently adversarial. The answer is mixed and largely depends on who is leading the government in Iran. Historical evidence indicates that during the Shah's regime, Iran and Israel had a relationship characterized by

Source: Reuters Harshit Sharma   Middle East Research Analyst Keywords: USA; Iran; Donald Trump; Kamala Harris; Masoud Pezeshkian; JCPOA Introduction The upcoming presidential elections in the United States of America are being closely watched by Iran’s strategic community. Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist who became the ninth President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the runoff elections held on July 5, 2024, campaigned in favor of more diplomatic engagement with the USA in order to lift the economic sanctions that are crippling Iran’s economy for a long time. The outcome of the presidential elections in the USA will play a major role in whether or not Pezeshkian will be able to deliver on his promise.   Republicans Vs Democrats If the Republicans under the presidentship of Donald Trump make a comeback, then the possibility of a deal between the USA and Iran looks bleak. During his previous tenure, Trump not only withdrew the USA from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in